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Abstract
When agents have present bias, they discount more between now and the
next period than between period t (> 1) and t + 1. How fast the fu-
ture discount rate (evaluated today) decays is an empirical question. We
show that the discount function can be non-parametrically identified with
contracts that specify payments that take place at various points in time
in the future and which are traded and priced in a competitive market.
We use a unique land lease-contract data set for Amsterdam, which has
the above properties, to test for present bias in a flexible way. We find
no evidence for present bias in this market. Even though we allow for a
general-hyperbolic specification (which has exponential discounting as a
special case), our estimates converge to an exponential discount function
with a corresponding discount rate (in our baseline specification) of 8 %.
∗We would like to thank Carla Flemmincks from the for valuable help with the land lease
data and the NVM for sharing their housing data with us. We thank conference and seminar
participants at various places for useful comments.
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1 Introduction
When agents have present bias, they discount more between now and the next
period than between period t (> 1) and t + 1. The notion of present bias goes
back to Strotz (1956) and has been applied to a variety of economic settings, see
Laibson (1997). Although the existence of present bias in some settings is not
controversial, there are still a number of open empirical questions. Those include,
under what circumstances is present bias most relevant and to which extent does
the discount rate change over time? In this paper we contribute to this literature
by using time variation in land lease-payment contracts to estimate present bias
in a flexible way. Specifically, we allow for a similar level of flexibility as in the
Benhabib et al. (2007).
What sort of data are required to identify present bias? At a given moment in
time we need contracts that specify payments that take place at various points in
time in the future which are traded and priced today in a market. We use data on
land lease in the city of Amsterdam that have this property. Land lease implies
that a part of the houses is built on land that is owned by the city of Amsterdam
and the home owners must pay land rent for the use of the land. The amount
that must be paid, when the payments must be received and how often they must
be made, is all specified in land lease contracts. Due to institutional changes and
idiosyncratic changes of previous home owners there exists substantial variation
in those contracts. To clarify this, suppose we observe two houses, labeled I and
II, that have the same predicted value based on neighborhood, size and other
characteristics. Suppose further that house I does not have to pay land lease
for the next 50 years and is sold for 350,000 in period t while house II must
pay 2000 euro per year starting 10 years from now for 50 years and is sold for
300,000 in period t. Then, the 50,000 difference in selling price is the market
valuation for not having to pay 2000 euro a year, 10 years from now. In our data
we observe a variety of contracts with different required payments at different
times for different periods which are all priced in the market. This is what allows
us to identify the presence of present bias. The structural assumptions that we
need to make for identification are that the housing and capital markets function
well, that there are no arbitrage opportunities in equilibrium, that agents have
the same time preferences and that they are risk neutral.
Our estimate depends on the expected inflation rate and the expected house-
price growth rate. We assume that the nominal house price changes follow the
GDP trend. We find that the Benhabib et al. (2007) specification converges to a
standard exponential discount function with a discount rate of 8%. As a robust-
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ness check we also look at higher and lower expected house price changes (the
lower bound we use is an expected growth rate of zero) and whether it matters
if use a three-step method (hedonics, house price growth, discount function) or
estimate our model simultaneously. In most cases we find no evidence for present
bias but different specifications do affect the estimated discount rates. However,
given previous research in this field, the range is small (between 6 and 11 %).
Most of the evidence for present bias comes from lab experiments, see Freder-
ick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) for an overview. Although some of the
evidence they discuss is convincing, we believe that evidence from the field can
give important additional information. Our data are interesting because first of
all the stakes are a lot higher than what is typically offered in the lab. Housing
is the largest investment spending for most people and land lease is a substantial
part of that. When the stakes are high, the incentives to invest in information
and to calculate (or let an expert calculate) the payoffs over time are large as
well. In addition, our population is different than the typical undergraduate pop-
ulation. Finally, experiments can be vulnerable to framing. There are of course
also drawbacks of our field data, namely that we have less control over the type
of contracts and we must make additional identifying assumptions (all agents
have identical discount functions and the housing market is competitive). We
therefore view our results as being complementary to the lab evidence.
Warner and Pleeter (2001) also use field data from the military drawdown pro-
gram data to estimate personal discount rates. This program offered separatees
the choice between an annuity and a lump-sum payment. Most of the separatees
selected the lump sum, implying a discount rate that exceeds 17%. An advantage
of their data is that they have information on individual characteristics and they
can identify individual discount rates. Their data does however not allow them
to identify present bias whereas with our data this is possible.
The existing papers that identify present bias with field data need to impose
more structure than we do. Ahumada and Garegnani (2007) use Argentinean con-
sumption data to estimate a hyperbolic Euler equation and find some evidence
for hyperbolic discounting after 2002 but they find exponential discounting before
2002. Fang and Wang (2008) use mammography (screening for breast cancer) de-
cisions and find evidence for both naivety and present bias. Fang and Silverman
(2009) estimate a labor supply model on a sample of never-married mothers and
allow for time-inconsistent preferences. They estimate the present bias factor to
be 0.338 and the standard discount factor to be 0.88, which implies a one-year dis-
count rate of 238%. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2007) structurally estimate
a buffer stock consumption model. Identification comes from the co-movement of
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retirement wealth accumulation, credit-card borrowing and consumption income.
Their benchmark estimates imply a 48.5% short-term annualized discount rate
and a 4.3% long-term annualized discount rate. Paserman (2007) structurally
estimates a job search model with hyperbolic discounting and endogenous search
effort. Agents in the model face a trade off between current cost (search effort)
and future benefits (wages). For low-wage workers, he rejects the exponential
discounting model and estimates a one-year discount rate of about 149%. To our
knowledge, none of the studies allow for the flexible functional form of Benhabib,
Bisin and Schotter (2007) as we do here.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section introduces the concepts
of present bias and hyperbolic discounting. Section 3 describes the land lease
system in Amsterdam and our other data sources. Section 4 gives some reduced
form results and Section 5 discusses our main test for present bias. Then, in
Section 6 we carry out a number of robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
2 Present bias and hyperbolic discounting
Under standard (exponential) discounting, if an agent is indifferent between re-
ceiving 100$ now or 105$ next year, she is also indifferent between receiving 100$
in ten years or 105$ in eleven years. When agents have present bias this is no
longer the case; preferences are time inconsistent and agents discount more be-
tween now and the next period than between t (>1) and t+1. The inconsistency
arises from the fact that the agent may decide today that she wants to have a
certain level of savings at period t + 1 but once she is in period t she wants to
postpone savings again to the future. One implication of this is that it can be
rational to voluntarily impose constraints on oneself.
The standard motivation for why agents discount is that future payoffs run
some risk of disappearing (see Yaari (1965)). However, if this is the main rea-
son for discounting than hyperbolic discounting requires that this risk becomes
smaller over time. Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) give an evolutionary expla-
nation for hyperbolic discounting based on uncertainty about when payoffs are
realized. For example, if an agent must choose between a small positive payoff
soon (Prospect P ) and a large payoff late (P ′) and if there is a small positive
probability that both payoffs are realized sooner, this can generate the typical
hyperbolic discounting behavior. An agent may initially prefer P ′ but as time
evolves switch to P because it becomes more likely that the payoff will not be
realized soon.
Villaverde and Mukherji (2006) point out that interpreting the existing ex-
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perimental evidence is difficult because future payments are also more subject
to uncertainty. Finally, an alternative way to interpret a lot of the experimental
evidence, based on bounded-rationality, is given by Rubinstein (2003).
The (quasi) hyperbolic discount literature replaces the constant discount util-
ity function with a particular alternative form, see Laibson (1997). Benhabib,
Bisin and Schotter (2007) propose a more general specification that allows for
present bias and also allows for fixed cost. Let t be a point in time and let
the discount function, D(t), be given so that an agent is indifferent between an
amount of yD(t) today (period 0) and y in period t. The subjective discount rate
is given by ∣∣∣∣∂D(t)/∂tD(t)
∣∣∣∣ .
The discount function, D(t) has exponential discounting if,
D(t) = exp(−ρt), ρ > 0, (1)
while it exhibits hyperbolic discounting if
D(t) =
1
1 + ρt
, ρ > 0,
and quasi hyperbolic discounting if
D(t) =
{
1
α exp(−ρt)
if t = 0
if t > 0
. (2)
Benhabib et al. (2007) propose the following econometric specification that cap-
tures all cases,1
d(t; θ, ρ) = (1− (1− θ) ρt) 11−θ
D(t) =
{
1
αd(t; θ, ρ)
if t = 0
if t > 0
(3)
where the top equation is a generalized parabola and θ measures the curvature
which is hyperbolic for θ = 2 and exponential for θ = 1. In the lower equation, a
quasi hyperbolic bias is present if α < 1.
There is some evidence that discounting declines with the amount to be dis-
counted, see Benhabib et al. (2007), Thaler (1981), Benzion, Rapaport and Yagil
(1989) and Green, Myerson and McFadden. Therefore, researchers have been in-
troducing discount functions which also depend on the amount to be discounted
1They also allow for a fixed cost from which we abstract here
4
(see for example Benhabib et al. 2007)). However, these proposed discounting
functions are not easy to interpret with contracts where an agent receives or pays
a range of quantities in the future. 2 This is the main reason why we do not
allow the discount rate to depend on the size of the payment.
Below, we explain how our data relate to the typical specification that is used
to estimate experimental data. Benhabib et al. (2007) assume that the data
generating process is as follows. Let yi(x, t) be the answer of subject i to the
question: what amount of money y makes you indifferent between x today and
y, t days from now where the maximum amount is yl?
x = yi(x, t)D(t)εi(x, t) (4)
and εi(x, t) is i.i.d. over subjects. Equation (4) can then be estimated with
NLS. In our data we compare approximately identical houses that differ in land-
lease contracts. Consider two identical houses A and B that are sold in period
t. House A has a land lease contract (LLC) of x1 euro a year for the next 10
years and then x11 per year must be paid for the following 50 years while house
B does not have to pay anything for the next 20 years and then y21 must be paid
for 50 years. The market price difference between house A and B reflects time
preferences. It is this type of information that we explore to estimate a general
discount function. 3 Finally, we want to emphasize that both in lab and field
studies we have to worry that agents can neutralize their actions in the capital
market. If capital markets have no imperfections and agents face no commitment
problems, monetary amounts at different times can be exchanged without cost
at the market interest rate, see also the discussion in Frederick et al. (2002).
Suppose for example that a student has a saving account where she gets 5%
interest. Suppose further that she participates in a lab experiment where she has
the choice between 100 dollars today and 100+x dollar in a year. If x < 5 she will
always prefer the first option even if she has a discount rate below 5% because
at the bank she can transfer 100 dollar today for 105 dollar next year. For a
land-lease contract that specifies that after 10 years, x euro a year must be paid,
it is potentially possible that the buyer makes an appropriate commitment today
2In particular, receiving two times y/2 on a particular date would be valued less than y on
the same date.
3Most of the literature assumes linear preferences (risk neutrality) over money and we do
the same here. Although potentially one could deal with concave preferences by estimating
xβ = yβD(t).
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and transforms this into one where y < x per year must be paid starting today.
In their summary of the literature, Frederick et al. (2002) argue that discount
rates can still be identified from choices among tradable rewards if agents ignore
opportunities for intertemporal arbitrage in the capital market because of (i)
informational or credit frictions or (ii) because they base their choices on other
considerations such as time preferences or the uncertainty that comes with delay.
Else, the discount rate is only identified if x > 5 in this example. In our main
empirical specification we allow agents to save at the market interest rate. We
return to this issue when we discuss identification.
3 Estimating present bias with land lease data
3.1 Land lease
Land lease is defined as the right to hold and to use someone else’s property. For
this right the leaseholder must pay the owner an annual fee. This is called the
land rent. Land lease is different from tenancy because it can be traded without
the intervention of the owner. The city of Amsterdam uses land-lease contracts
since 1896. Before that period all land was sold, while after that period the city
of Amsterdam always remains the owner of the land. Some houses were property
of the city before 1896 and were sold afterwards and the city also frequently buys
land belonging to pre-1896 houses. Therefore, there are also land-lease contracts
in the older neighborhoods. Houses built after 1896 are always under a land-lease
contract unless these houses were built on land that was already sold before 1896.
This implies a non-perfect concentration of houses on own land in the older (and
usually more popular) neighborhoods of the city. We take this into account in
our empirical analysis.
The duration of a land-lease contract is typically 50 years which we call the
period of lease. At the beginning of the lease period the terms are specified in
a contract called the ”general conditions” (GC). At present, new contracts are
based on the General conditions for perpetual land leases in Amsterdam 2000
(GC2000). However, land-lease contracts with an earlier starting date belong to
different GC’s. At the date of termination the newest conditions are valid. At
the moment, there are contracts that belong to GC’s determined in 1915, 1937,
1955, 1966, 1994 and 2000.
An important difference between the recent GC’s and those before 1966 con-
cerns the land rent which was mainly a fixed amount before 1966 and is sometimes
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fixed after 1966 and always variable under GC2000.4 Another difference between
the period before 1966 and the period afterwards is that in the contracts from
the earlier periods the land rent period was 75 years while it is only 50 years for
the more recent contracts.
At the end of the period of lease, the municipality offers a new contract. 5 This
is determined as follows. The land-lease payments depend on the estimated value
of the land. Two years before the period of lease terminates, the municipality
sends out a proposal for the value of the land which is estimated by the so called
residual method. The land price per square meter is calculated by the residual that
remains after subbstracting the estimated construction costs from the estimated
market value of the property.
The land-lease owner is allowed to reject the proposal by the municipality.
In that case a committee of independent experts is appointed (one member is
appointed by the city, one by the leaseholder and one by the other two). As
Nelisse (2008) and Veen (2004) show, the offer of the municipality is almost always
rejected because it is higher than the experts’ evaluation. So for the expected
new contracts we can focus on the independent experts who are typically real-
estate agents. Their procedure is as follows: (1) estimate the total value of the
property and multiply this by the land ratio, which is a parameter that usually
depends on the neighborhood of the house, and (2) multiply the result with 0.6
in order to take into account that land with property has less value than land
without property. 6 A final aspect of the price determination of the experts is
that they try to follow the long-term market trends by determining the total value
of the property (in step (1)) instead of the short-term fluctuations of the market.
After determining the land price, the (yearly) land rent is simply calculated as a
percentage of the land price.7
3.2 Data
We have data from three different sources. The first source comes from the city
of Amsterdam. It contains all the information about land-lease contracts that
4In the period between 1966 and 2000 different systems were effective from variable to fixed
over the period of lease.
5In very special cases, the municipality is able to terminate further land rent after the end
of the period of lease. In that case the municipality pays the value of the houses. However,
these cases happen very rarely and hence we can safely assume in our empirical analysis that
leaseholders expect their right to lease the land to last indefinitely.
6In practice, the land ratio differs between 0.20 and 0.25, see Veen (2004) for more details.
7The exact percentage depends on the specific contract and on the district within the city.
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were effective between 2007 and 2010 with a distinction between those houses for
which the land rent is paid in advance and the houses for which the land lease
must be paid immediately. In total, we have 158,380 houses for which the land
lease is paid in advance. For these houses we have the identifier of the house
from the Dutch register, the beginning and the end date of the contract and the
beginning and the end date for which the land rent has been paid in advance.
Finally, we have information on the general conditions of the land-lease contract,
we have the special conditions of the payment period and the exact amount that
has to be paid annually during the years of observation. In total there are 56,242
houses for which the land lease was not paid in advance and for which immediate
payments must be made.
Our second data set is from the Dutch association of real-estate agents (NVM).
It contains at least 70 percent of the total houses sold in Amsterdam over our
observation window. The start of the data set is the 1st of January 1985 and
the end of the observation window is the 31st of December of 2009. The total
number of sales available is 106346. For every house a large set of characteristics
is available based on the information known to the real-estate agent. Among
others, we have the address, zip code, the selling price, size (both in square and
cubic feet) as well as a large set of features that may have an impact on the price
of the house, such as indicators for maintenance (inside and outside the house),
period of construction, indicators for the heating system, the situation of the
house, the house type, whether there is a garden, balcony, roof terrace or garage
attached to the house. We also have an indicator whether the house is under a
land-lease contract.
As a third data set we have an official list from the municipality of all houses
registered in Amsterdam in 2010. This data set contains the identifier from the
Dutch register as well as the address and zip code. We use this data set to
match the other two data sets since it contains both the address, zip-code and
the registrational code which is used for the land-lease contracts of our first data
set.
We merge the second and third data set in order to obtain the identifiers
from the registers of all the houses in the second data set. Here, we use street
address (with house number and addendum) and zip code. We were able to
match 92662 out of the 106346 house sales that appeared in the data from the
real-estate association. The main reason we were not able to match all the houses
is that the house identifier used by the real-estate agent sometimes is not equal
to the house identifier used by the municipality. Especially, the addendum used
by the real-estate agent often differs from the addendum used by the municipal-
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ity. Even though we put a lot of effort in matching those houses with different
addendums we have been quite conservative in order to minimize the number of
wrong matches. Another reason for not being able to match all houses is that
some houses sold between 1985 and 2009 do not exist in 2010 and the newly built
houses during 2010 did not yet have an official address. We also delete the houses
that are not a single unit for the Dutch land register. The problem with these
houses is that they do not have a private contract for land lease with the mu-
nicipality, but instead have a collective contract together with the other houses.
Hence, we cannot identify the exact amount of land rent that must be paid by
the owner of such a house. This resulted in a deletion of 28464 houses.
Next, we merge the resulting data set with the first data set of all the land-
lease contracts. Since the land-lease data set contains all contracts, we can define
a house to be located on private land if we cannot find a corresponding land-lease
contract. There are a few cases where the real-estate agent indicates that the
house is not situated on private land. If this occurs, we delete the observation
from our data set (about 2 percent). In addition, we merge houses based on
the contract that was in place at the moment of the sale. Since we only have
information on contracts that were effective over the period 2007 to 2010, some
house sales are lost since we do not have any information about the land-lease
contract of the house at the moment the house was sold. In total this leaves
us with 56587 house sales and after deletion of the houses that do not have all
information necessary for estimation (such as size), we keep 49047 observations.
Table 1 below gives some descriptive statistics of our final data set. We make
a distinction between private land and land lease. This last category is further
subdividided into paid in advance, variable and fixed land lease. Table 1 shows
that less than half of the houses are on private land and that the prices of these
houses are higher than the prices in any other category. More surprising is the
fact that houses with a variable land rent are more expensive than those paid
in advance. The most likely reason for this is the fact that those houses are
typically sold after 2000. There are not many differences in size between the
different categories. However, there are differences between the neighborhoods.
For example, own land is overrepresented in the more expensive areas in the city
center and the western and southern parts close to the Center. Also for variable
land rent, the old Western and Southern parts of the city are overrepresented,
while paid in advance and fixed land rent are overrepresented in less popular
areas.
For the empirical analysis we divide Amsterdam into 90 different neighbor-
hoods. Those neighborhood definitions are based on Statistics Amsterdam and
9
within a neighborhood houses and economic status of the owners are approx-
imately homogenous. Our empirical implementation is based on comparisons
within neighborhoods. If some neighborhoods only contain houses on own land
or only houses with land lease, then we cannot separately identify a neighbor-
hood and a land-lease effect. Therefore, we deleted all neighborhoods that do
not have at least 10 observations from either houses on own land, land lease paid
in advance or land rent not paid in advance. This results in a deletion of 53
neighborhoods. Descriptive statistics of the final data set can be found in the
lower panel of Table 1.
4 Results from reduced-form equations
The first panel of Table 2 lists the results of a regression of price on observed
characteristics, neighborhood dummies and the number of years the land rent
is paid in advance by the previous owner as well as on a dummy for private
ownership of the land (houses which are not paid in advance are excluded). We
find, as expected, that a house on own land is more expensive. In addition, we find
that the number of years that no land rent has to be paid (because the previous
owner paid this in advance) has a significant and positive effect on the house
price. In Figure 1 we show the relationship between the spell of time that no
land lease has to be paid and the discount on the house price. We have relatively
few houses for which the spell of time before the (fixed) contract must be renewed
is less than 25 years. This explains the large variance in the beginning.
Next, we turn to houses where the buyer must immediately start to pay land
lease. Regressing the house price on the land rent is not a useful exercise if one
is interested in the causal effect of land rent on the house price because houses
with attractive unobserved characteristics have a higher land rent. However, we
do know that there is variation in land rent based on the general conditions of
the land-lease contract, while there is not a direct impact on the house price
itself.8 Therefore, in order to estimate the impact of land rent on the house
price, we can use these different general conditions as instruments. The results
8For example, an important change in the general conditions took place in 1966. As discussed
in Section 3.1, before 1966, land lease holders who were offered a new contract paid a fixed
land rent and the lease period was typically 75 years. After 1966, the land rent was increased
periodically taking the inflation rate into account. Therefore, we expect a large difference in
the lease rent between houses for which the land-lease contract was renewed before 1966 and
the houses for which it was renewed just after 1966. Since we are looking at the current market,
anticipation effects around the date of 1966 are irrelevant.
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Own Paid in Not paid in advance
land advance Fixed Variable
Including neighborhoods with few observations
Number of observations 29735 12287 5551 1298
Price 246627 249510 171984 278841
Size in square feet 931 1109 953 1033
Neighborhoods
Number of neighborhoods 90 90 90 90
Centrum 31.0 6.3 0.6 3.6
West 26.4 8.0 9.8 15.9
East 10.4 23.3 1.6 10.0
North 1.6 12.2 12.3 11.8
New-West 0.9 31.3 25.7 2.5
South-East 0.2 11.7 9.8 15.6
South 29.5 7.1 40.1 40.6
Excluding neighborhoods with few observations
Number of observations 15856 2716 784 463
Price 248929 242514 119524 266452
Size in square feet 951 959 812 944
Neighborhoods
Number of neighborhoods 27 27 27 27
Centrum 32.7 24.9 4.2 7.1
West 14.8 14.2 67.7 40.8
East 11.8 25.2 11.0 27.4
North 0.8 21.6 0.6 2.6
New-West 0.9 2.9 13.8 1.7
South-East 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
South 38.9 11.2 2.7 20.3
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the data set.
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Variable Estimate
Panel 1: regression of price on number of years paid in advance
Private land 0.1791
(0.0221)
Number of years paid in advance (x100) 0.0030
(0.0004)
Panel 2: regression of price on land rent
Ordinary least squares
Land rent -0.0132
(0.0060)
Instrumental variable estimation
Land rent -0.0303
(0.0078)
Table 2: Results of reduced form estimates. In all specifications we also correct for
size, neighborhoods, squared footage times neighborhood and period of construc-
tion, period of construction times neighborhood, year, year times neighborhood,
year2 times construction, nine categorical dummies for maintenance inside, nine
categorical dummies for maintenance outside, dummy for monument, dummy for
(partly) let, five categorical dummies for situation, dummy for new house, dummy
for investment project, three categorical dummies for heating system, five cat-
egorical dummies for isolation. The IV estimates use the general conditions as
instruments.
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Figure 1: Relationship between house price and the number of years that no land
lease has to be paid
of this exercise are in the second panel of Table 2. The upper panel of this table
contains estimates of the simple ordinary least squares regressions. As expected,
the IV estimates give a stronger negative relation between land lease and house
price. We note that our empirical analysis is mainly based on the same idea of
taking into account the present conditions of the land lease contract as well as
the (expected) future payments. We explain how we take this into account to
explore this information to estimate the discount function.
5 Testing for hyperbolic discounting with land
lease data
5.1 Model
Consider a neighborhood with a large number of identical houses that are sold
either on own land or under different land-lease contracts.
Suppose that all buyers can get a mortgage with an interest rate equal to
r and that there are no credit constraints up to the value of the house at the
moment of buying. In addition, we assume that D(1) < 1/(1+ r).9 Let p̂i be the
9This implies that there is no reason for individuals to save up to the end of the time horizon.
We let the data decide wether this is true.
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price of a house on own land. The flow costs of such a house are equal to:
p̂i × r ×
∞∑
s=1
D(s). (5)
The owner of a house who leases the land makes additional payments at different
points in time. Denote the land rent in period t by Ct and the price of such a
house by pi. The total costs associated with this house equal:
pi × r ×
∞∑
s=1
D(s) +
∞∑
s=1
D(s)Cs (6)
In a competitive market, buyers must be indifferent between buying a house with
private land and with land lease. Therefore, the price of the house without land
falls until there is no arbitrage possible implying that (5) and (6) must be equal
in equilibrium:
p̂i × r ×
∞∑
s=1
D(s) = pi × r ×
∞∑
s=1
D(s) +
∞∑
s=1
D(s)Cs.
Solving for pi gives,
pi = p̂i −
∑
∞
s=1D(s)Cs
r ×∑∞s=1D(s) = p̂i −
∑
∞
s=1D(s)Cs
r ×∑∞s=1D(s) (7)
Hence, the price of a house with land lease is equal to the price of that house if
it would be located on private land minus the properly discounted costs of the
land rent.
Above, we assumed that buyers do not sell their houses. In reality houses
are sold frequently (many even within 5 years) so this assumption is violated.
However, although the calculus becomes more tedious, our results are not affected
as long as drops in house prices can be financed with loans.10
10In particular, houses for which the land rent is paid in advance are likely to drop in value
when the end of the land-lease contract comes in sight. The assumption that this devaluation
can be financed by loans is hard to defend since banks are reluctant to refinance previous
mortgages whenever the house is sold and when they are willing to do so, they usually require
a higher interest rate. However, house prices have actually been increasing at high rates in
the past decades. Hence in practice most homeowners do not have to refinance and will only
receive less interest payments on their future savings or have to pay higher interest payments
on the mortgage of the next house.
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5.2 Identification
In this subsection we show that a necessary assumption for identification of the
model parameters of the previous subsection is that there is variation in the
land rents Ct over time. If the land rent would be constant in all periods, i.e.
Ct = C, t > 0, then,
p̂i − pi = C
r
(8)
and the difference in prices is not informative on the shape of the discount function
D. This negative result can be explained as follows: when the land rent is
constant, a buyer has two options. Either, she buys a house on own land and
pays a fixed mortgage payment every period, or she buys a house without the
land and she pays a fixed mortgage payment plus the land rent every period.
The no-arbitrage condition implies that those payments should be equal and
therefore the extra amount that she pays for her mortgage when owning the land
(i.e. (p̂i − pi)r), must be equal to the costs of the land rent. Below, we argue
that having variation in Ct is not only necessary but in many cases also sufficient
for identification of D.
To illustrate this, suppose that the seller paid in advance the land lease 30
years ago for 50 years. Then, a new buyer pays nothing for t0 = 20 years and gets
a new land rent contract afterwards. Figure 2 illustrates this for a transformation
in constant yearly payments. The horizontal line represents the per period costs
that a home owner makes for a house on own land (i.e. p̂i × r) and for a house
where the costs are pi × r for the first 20 periods (only mortgage payments) and
pi × r + C (mortgage plus land rent) afterwards. The no-arbitrage condition
implies that in present-value terms, the discounted values for both houses should
be equal. In terms of equation (7),
p̂i − pi(t0) = C
r
×
∑
∞
s=t0+1
D(s)∑
∞
s=1D(s)
(9)
If we observe many identical houses with different t′0s, we can estimate D(s) for
T periods. Then, equation (9) generates T − 1 equations in D(s), s = 1, . . . T .
This implies that, given p̂i, pi(t0), t0 = 1, . . . T−1, C and r, D(s), s = 1, . . . T, can
be non-parametrically identified up to a constant. In reality, not for all houses
the land lease is paid in advance. However, in many situations, these houses still
have identifying information since the expected land rent payments have some
variation. For example, there are houses with a fixed (and usually low) land rent
up to the end of the period of lease after which the land rent will be substantially
higher.
15
Unfortunately, α in equation (3) can only be identified if some payments have
to be paid at the moment of buying the house. However, we assume that both
the mortgage payments and the land rent is paid at the end of the first year after
buying the house.11 Therefore, α drops out because it appears proportionally in
both the numerator and denominator of (9).
Finally, the fact that we allow agents to save at the market interest rate has
an important implication for identification. Suppose an agent considers to buy
a house on private land or a house with land lease that must be paid in the
future and assume that the interest rate at period 0 exceeds the discount rate.
In that case, she can buy the cheaper house (with land lease payments in the
future) and start saving for the future payments today. Therefore, the difference
in prices between both houses will be driven by the market interest rate and not
by the discount function. Hence, if we find the estimated discount rate in the
first period to be lower than the interest rate, then we can only identify the upper
bound of the discount rate which equals the interest rate in that case. However,
if her discount rate at period 0 exceeds the market interest rate, she will not start
saving for the future land-rent payments and the house price differences will be
driven by the discount function.12
5.3 Empirical implementation
In our empirical application, Cs is not constant and therefore the empirical anal-
ysis is more complicated than sketched in the previous section. In addition, not
all houses are identical and we do not observe all relevant characteristics. An-
other practical issue is that we do not know the exact cost of future land-lease
contracts so we have to form expectations about them (which are based on the
institutional details that we discussed in Section 3.1).
Figure 3 gives a schematic overview of our object of investigation. Time is
indicated by s and the year that a particular house is bought is denoted by t.
Suppose that the number of years since the beginning of the period of lease equals
τ and that the original contract was for J years, so t − τ is the year in which
the last period of lease started. Let t0 = τ + J − t be the number of years until
the present period of lease expires. This implies that the current period of lease
11This assumption does not completely match and it might be possible that in some cases
payments are made at the moment of buying the house. Although this would help the identifi-
cation of α, it would really depend on the assumptions about the moments at which payments
are made.
12Note that this assumes that the maximum amount of the mortgage is determined by the
house price. This is the case in the Netherlands.
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Figure 3: Time line for our empirical implementation
expires at period t+ t0.
We use i for an observation in the data set and assume that the observations
are ordered as follows; first the houses on private land, next the houses for which
the land rent is paid in advance and finally we have the houses for which the land
rent is not paid in advance. In addition, the number of observations for these
three different groups are assumed to be respectively n1, n2 and n3.
Next, we must make additional identifying assumptions to deal with the fact
that houses are not identical. Let xi be the individual characteristics of a house
and ηj a set of dummy variables, which equals one if house i is in region j and
zero otherwise. Assume that the price of a house with private land is given by,
log p̂i = xiβ + ηJ(i) + νi (10)
Here, νi is interpreted as the unobserved characteristics of the house. We make
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the additional assumption that the price of a house that includes the land, changes
from our base year, 1985, with a growth rate ψt. Hence, the (log) price of a house
t periods from now is: log p̂i,t = log p̂i +
∑t
s=1 log(1 + ψs). Note that we can
estimate β, ηJ(i) and ψs by OLS using the houses that are located on own land
(i.e. using observations 1, . . . n1).
The biggest hurdle we must take is to determine future values of Ci,s. As we
discussed in Section 3.1, the land lease in the periods τ and t + t0 is in practice
calculated as a fixed percentage, γi, of the value of the house on own land in those
periods. We allow γi to be different in different neighborhoods, hence γi = γJ(i).
We consider two cases (see Section 3.1): (i) houses for which the lease has
been paid in advance for t0 years and (ii) houses for which the land lease has not
been paid in advance and for which immediate payments must be made. This
last case can be further subdivided into fixed and variable land lease.
We start with the first case. For these houses Ci,s = 0 as long as s < t + t0.
If s ≥ t+ t0 payments must be made. Let ϕt′ be the expected land rent increase
within a period in year t′, then
Ci,s = γJ(i) exp
(
t0∑
t′=1
ψt′ +
s∑
t′=t0
ϕt′
)
p̂i,t. (11)
The payments of houses for which the land lease is not paid in advance is also
given by equation (11) as long as s ≥ t+t0. However, it is different when s < t+t0.
For the fixed case we get,
Ci,s = γJ(i)p̂i,τ , (12)
where the house price in period τ follows from p̂i,τ
(∑t−1
t′=τ ψt′
)
= p̂i,t, while for
the variable case it is,
Ci,s = γJ(i)p̂i,τ exp
(
t−1∑
t′=τ
ϕt′
)
. (13)
Combining these two equations, dropping the subscript s (which is always t for the
observations) and taking logs gives the following regression equation for houses
with a land rent which is not paid in advance (i.e. observations i = n1 + n2 +
1, . . . n1 + n2 + n3),
logCi −
t−1∑
t′=τ
ϕt′di − log p̂i,τ = log γJ(i) + υi, (14)
where di is a dummy variable that equals one for a variable land lease.
13 This
13We use the true house price increases for the period after 1985 and before 1985 we use the
trend, so pi,τ follows from,
(∑
1985
t′=τ ψ +
∑t−1
t′=1985 ψt1(t
′ ≥ τ)
)
pi,τ =E(pi,t) + υi
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makes it possible to estimate log γJ(i) and ψt (for t < 1985) using OLS. We use
the overall price deflator published by Statistics Netherlands, which is also used
by the municipality.14
Based on these estimates and the equations for Ci,s defined above, we can
predict the future values of Ci,s. Substitution of (11) into (7) and replacing p̂i,τ
by its estimate (exp
(−∑t0s′=0 (ψs′)) p̂i,t) results in an equation for the houses that
are paid t0 years in advance:
log pi,t(t0) = log p̂i,t + log
(
1− γ
r
exp
(
t0∑
s′=0
ψs′
)∑
∞
s=t0
D(s) exp
(∑s
s′=t0
ϕs
)∑
∞
s=1D(s)
)
Using the approximation log(1− x) ≈ −x, (10) and dropping t0 on the left-hand
side, we obtain a regression equation for the houses with a land rent that is paid
in advance:
log pi = E log p̂i,t − γ
r
exp
(
t0∑
s′=0
ψs′
)∑
∞
s=t0
D(s) exp
(∑s
s′=t0
ϕs′
)∑
∞
s=1D(s)
+ υi (15)
Similar formulas can be derived for houses that are not paid in advance (see
Appendix A for details). From (15) and the formulas derived in the appendix,
we can estimate the function D(s) using non-linear least squares.
The final hurdle that we must take is to determine ϕs′ and ψs′ for s
′ > 0, i.e.
the future values of the inflation rate minus one percent and the rate at which the
house prices are going to increase. We assume these values to be constant, which
seems to be a valid assumption given the fact that most values for s′ are far in
the future. We assume here that long-run house price changes are equal to the
nominal GDP trend. For our baseline analysis we base the trend on the average
figures growth rate over the past 25 years. 15 This gives ψ = 4.23, φ = 0.93 and
r = 5.69 percent. In our robustness checks we also use average figures over the
past 50 years. In that case ψ = 2.54, φ = 5.26 and r = 6.84. 16 The higher ψ the
more attractive it is to have a house on own land. This implies that a given price
difference between a house on own land and land lease can only be rationalized
14We test this assumption for the years that we had sequential data of the ground rent(2001-
2009) and find a perfect fit.
15We use the Penn World Table to find real GDP increases per capita and we use inflation
figures from Statistics Netherlands. Finally, we use nominal interest rates figures from Eurostat.
16Note that our estimates are quite close to those found in Eicholtz (1997). He finds a 5.3
percent for the nominal house price increase for the period 1945 to 1973. If we use housing
data for the past 50 years we find a higher value for ψ of 6% which is mainly due to the
explosive price increases in the 90’s which we believe are not representative for future house
price expectations.
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by a relatively large discount rate. As a final robustness check, we set ψ equal to
zero to obtain a lower bound on our estimated discount rate.
Note that the main identifying assumption of equation (15) is that vi is inde-
pendent of log p̂ (and hence x) and on the conditions of the land-lease contract
(such as fixed, variable land rent and the number of years paid in advance). In
words, we assume that the distribution of unobserved characteristics conditional
on the observed characteristics is the same between houses with different land-
lease contracts as well as houses on private land. This assumption is impossible
to test, but note that we only consider houses in neighborhoods where all types of
land-lease contracts are offered and that have sufficiently many houses on private
land.
In our baseline estimates we use a three-step approach to estimate the pa-
rameters of the model and we have to take this into account when calculating the
standard errors. We describe this in Appendix B.
5.4 Results
For each house we can now calculate the amount and timing of future land-lease
payments. Our aim is to use those data to flexibly estimate D(t) as defined in
equation (3). We estimate four different functional forms of this equation that
are common in the literature: (I) exponential, θ = 1, (II) hyperbolic, θ = 2, (III)
general hyperbolic, θ ≥ 1. For all these cases we set α = 1 since as discussed
in Section 5.2, we cannot identify α from our empirical analysis. Note that
specifications (I) and (II) are special cases of (III).
Our estimation procedure consists of three steps. First, we estimate the he-
donics (equation 10), which allows us to calculate the predicted value of each
house if it would be located on own land. Then, in the second step, we estimate
the expected relationship between house price and land rent (i.e. γJ9i) in equa-
tion 14). Finally, in the third step we estimate the discount function, given the
estimates of step (1) and (2). The advantage of this is that it is transparent, it
allows us to see the accuracy of each step and it is simple. As a robustness check,
we also estimate the model simultaneously in Section 6. This is less transparent
but has some advantages in terms of efficiency. It however does not change our
main conclusion that we find no evidence for present bias but it does make the
estimated discount rate a bit higher. Finally, we fix the market interest rate at
its average value (0.0569). In Section 6, we also estimate the interest rate and
we find values that are slightly higher (between 7 and 9 %).
Table 3 reports the results of the first step of our estimation procedure that
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gives the hedonics. The most important part of this table is the R2 value which
indicates that we can explain more than 95 percent of the observed variation in
house prices by observed characteristics. This is encouraging because it allows us
to price the various land-lease contracts (given the observed characteristics of the
house). In addition, we find that almost all of the reported coefficients in Table
3 have the right sign and are significant.
Table 4 lists the results of the second step of our estimation method (to
get an estimate for γ). The R2-value of this step is only 0.4984 with fixed
land rent having an R2-value equal to 0.4322 and variable land rent having an
R2− valueequalto0.4116.This is partly due to the fact that it is more difficult to
explain the variation in the land-lease payments. However, it is also the result
of the relatively small number of regressors we use in this step. Of course, we
could have made more regressors dependent on γ but as stated above, there is
no reason to expect variation between the land-lease payments to be based on
other characteristics.17 We find that there are remarkable differences between the
different neighborhoods. A Hausmann test on joint significance of the neighbor-
hood effects results in a statistic of 797 which strongly rejects the null-hypothesis
of no differences between neighborhoods. 18
Table 5 presents the main results on the discount rate and present bias. The
aim is to compare the sum of squared errors for all cases. Our main finding is that
the exponential model does much better than the standard-hyperbolic model and
that the general hyperbolic specification converges to exponential discounting. So
we find no evidence for present bias. The hyperbolic specification implies that
myopic behavior gives the best fit of our model but again the performance of this
specification is very bad. Finally, we find that the discount rate equals 8 percent
which is a reasonable number. Frederick et al. (2002) summarize the empirical
literature and report values that range from negative to plus infinity.
Table 6 lists the R2-values for different parts of the data set. The exponential
specification performs well. With this specification we can explain more than 93
% of the variance of house prices with land-lease contracts. As, expected from the
earlier results the standard-hyperbolic model predicts house prices very poorly.
Another way to look at the performance of our model is to compare the
average predicted values with the observed values from the data set. Table 7
17Including all other characteristics that we also used in the first step of the analysis results in
an R2-value of 0.639. However, the standard errors increase a lot making almost all coefficients
non-significant.
18This statistic follows a χ2-distribution with 27 degrees of freedom under the null-
hypothesis).
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Variable Estimate
Log squared footage (×100) 0.5569
(0.0201)
Log cubic footage (×1mln) 0.1451
(0.0069)
Number of rooms 0.0173
(0.0013)
Monument 0.0456
(0.0054)
Garden 0.0386
(0.0037)
Garage 0.0240
(0.0024)
Luxurious 0.0350
(0.0038)
# of balconies 0.0116
(0.0027)
Roof terrace 0.0391
(0.0042)
Congested road -0.0412
0.0061
Basement 0.0131
(0.0089)
# of bathrooms 0.0212
(0.0028)
Ground surface (x100) 0.0068
(0.0024)
R2 0.9579
Number of observations 15586
Table 3: Estimates of the first stage regression of log house prices of houses on
own land on house characteristics. We also correct for neighborhoods, squared
footage times neighborhood and period of construction, period of construction
times neighborhood, year, year times neighborhood, year2 times construction,
nine categorical dummies for maintenance inside, nine categorical dummies for
maintenance outside, dummy for monument, dummy for (partly) let, five cat-
egorical dummies for situation, dummy for new house, dummy for investment
project, three categorical dummies for heating system, five categorical dummies
for isolation
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Variable Estimate Variable Estimate
Grachtengordel-Zuid 0.9456 Stadionbuurt -1.4564
(0.4296) (0.2798)
Nieuwmarkt/Lastage -0.7077 IJselbuurt -0.9329
(0.3891) (0.2931)
Diamantbuurt -0.0127 Rijnbuurt -1.074
(0.2189) (0.2806)
Transvaalbuurt -1.5348 Frankendael -0.1274
(0.2961) (0.2879)
Indische buurt oost -1.3166 Middenmeer -1.1081
(0.2835) (0.2806)
Landlust -0.8673 Volewijck -1.3202
(0.2792) (0.3250)
Erasmuspark -1.2310 Oostzanerwerf 0.7359
(0.2817) (0.3392)
De Kromert -0.9882 Nieuwedam Noord -0.1202
(0.2861) (0.2800)
Van Galenbuurt -1.2952 Slotermeer Zuidwest -0.9011
(0.2901) (0.2792)
Hoofdweg e.o. -2.2027 Osdorp Midden -0.4988
(0.2861) (0.2811)
Hoofdorppleinbuurt -1.0003 Sloter-/riekpolder -0.1036
(0.2890) (0.3004)
Willemspark -0.2578 Buitenveldert west -0.5128
(0.3004) (0.2777)
Museumkwartier -0.5129 ψ -0.0149
(0.2992) (0.0010)
Constant -4.8435
(0.3633)
R2 0.5462 Number of observations 3145
Table 4: Results of the second stage regression of the log land rent on neighbor-
hood and the number of years since start of land rent.
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Exponential Standard General
hyperbolic hyperbolic
Basic model parameters
ρ 0.0820 ∞ 0.0820
(0.0099) (·) (0.0099)
θ 1.000 2.000 1.000
(·)
Sum of squared residuals 93.80 57329 93.80
Table 5: Baseline results of the model estimates.
Exponential Standard General
hyperbolic hyperbolic
Overall 0.9330 -37.19 0.9330
Paid by previous owner 0.8247 -133.05 0.8247
Fixed land rent 0.9673 -3.6064 0.9673
Variable land rent 0.9029 -17.09 0.9029
Table 6: R2 values for the different parts of the dataset
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Figure 4: Relationship between house price and the number of years that have
been paid in advance
lists the results from this exercise. For all the different types of houses (i.e.
private land, paid by previous owner, fixed and variable land rent) we report the
observed values, the estimated values and the estimated values on private land.
Not surprisingly, these are all the same for the private land group. In addition,
as expected, the average value of house prices on private land exceeds the average
observed value for the other categories. The estimated values of the model (i.e.
the second column) should be as close as possible to the observed averages. We
find small differences for the exponential model where the estimated value slightly
overpredictings the average price of a house which is paid in advance while it
slightly underpredicts the average price of the other two categories. Again, the
standard hyperbolic performs very poor.
Figure 4 looks at the fit over the years. The first panel is for houses where
the land lease was paid by the previous owner, the second one for fixed land rent
and the last one for variable land rent.
6 Robustness checks
In this section, we present robustness checks on some of the assumptions we
made in the previous section. First, in section 6.1 we estimate the interest rate
rather than use calibrated values. Then in section 6.2 we estimate all three
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Prices
Observed Predicted Predicted on
own land
Exponential
Land rent
Paid by previous owner 12.305 12.307 12.347
Fixed land rent 11.425 11.404 11.453
Variable land rent 12.352 12.314 12.379
Standard Hyperbolic
Land rent
Paid by previous owner 12.305 8.7629 12.347
Fixed land rent 11.425 10.097 11.453
Variable land rent 12.352 10.812 12.379
General hyperbolic
Land rent
Paid by previous owner 12.305 12.307 12.347
Fixed land rent 11.425 11.453 11.453
Variable land rent 12.351 12.314 12.379
Table 7: Average (predicted) values for the different parts of the dataset (using
logs)
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steps simultaneously rather than in three steps. Section 6.3 gives the estimation
results excluding the variable land-lease contracts and finally in section 6.4, we
use different values for the expected inflation rate and the house price trend. The
bottom line is that our main results are robust. The hyperbolic specification
always performs bad. Only in the case where we estimate the interest rate, we
find some evidence for present bias; θ is 1.1 rather than 1. However, even in
that case, the SSR is almost the same as in the nested exponential case. In all
other cases we find that the general hyperbolic converges to the exponential. If
house prices are expected not to increase over time, the estimated discount rate
is about 1 %. In all other cases, with different inflation rates and different GDP
trends, we find the estimated discount rate to be in the order of 6-10 %.
6.1 The interest rate
For our baseline analysis we set the level of the interest rate equal to the interest
rate over the past 25 years. However, even in the exponential case the interest
rate is identified and can be estimated. Table 8 lists the results of this exercise. In
general, we find that the interest rate is estimated to be larger than the discount
rate in the first period and, as discussed at the end of Section 5.2, in that case
we can only estimate an upper bound of the discount rate. In addition, we find
the estimated interest rates to be a bit higher than the interest rate over the past
25 and 50 years. Since for the market participants the expected interest rate is
relevant, we prefer the baseline analysis. Nevertheless, it is a good sign that the
estimated interest rates are of the same order of magnitude as the observed ones.
Table 8 indicates that the general hyperbolic model does slightly better than the
exponential model. Although this can be a sign that there is indeed some present
bias, we should be careful here. Note that the discount rate in the first period
(i.e. ρ) should be interpreted here as an upper bound and the discount function
can only be identified if we assume that ρ exactly equals its upper bound. We
also see that the performance of the exponential specification in terms of SSR is
almost as good as the general hyperbolic.
6.2 Simultaneous estimation of the three stages
In our baseline analysis, we estimate our model in a three-stage estimation pro-
cedure. It is also possible to estimate all the three steps simultaneously. The
results of this exercise are summarized in Table 9. We find a bit higher discount
rates than in our baseline analysis, but still there does not seem to be any support
for the presence of present bias. The simultaneous estimation procedure has a
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Exponential Standard General
hyperbolic hyperbolic
Basic model parameters
ρ 0.0739 ∞ 0.0925
(·) (·) (·)
θ 1.000 2.000 1.1058
(0.1068)
r 0.0739 ∞ 0.0925
(0.0012) (·) (0.0231)
Sum of squared residuals 92.88 101.11 92.72
Table 8: Results based on estimated interest rates
somewhat better fit than our three step estimation procedure. This follows from
Table 9 that reports the sum of sqaured residuals (note that the overall sum of
squared residuals is higher than in the previous tables since it also includes the
sum of squared residuals of equations (10) and (14)).
If the distribution of the unobserved characteristics of all houses, conditional
on the observed characteristics, is not the same for houses with different land-
lease contracts, the regression coefficients of the first step and second step in our
three-step method will be (significantly) different from the estimates we obtain in
our simultaneous procedure. A test on whether the estimates of β from equation
(10) are significantly different for the two estimation methods results in a test
statistic equal to 268. Under the null-hypothesis of no difference between the
estimated β’s from the two estimation methods, this test-statistic follows a χ2
distribution with 215 degrees of freedom. This implies that the null-hypothesis is
not rejected. For the difference with the second step estimator we obtain a test
statistic equal to 2.6 and this statistic follows a χ2 distribution with 27 degrees of
freedom under the null. Hence, also this test is not rejected. If we take all three
steps together we obtain a test statistic which is equal to 280 and this statistic
has 242 degrees of freedom. This implies that there is no evidence that our model
is misspecified by estimating the fact that the unobserved characteristics of the
houses on private land are different from the unobserved characteristics of the
houses with a land-lease contract.
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Exponential Standard General
hyperbolic hyperbolic
Basic model parameters
ρ 0.1133 ∞ 0.1133
(0.0176) (·) (0.0176)
θ 1.000 2.000 1.000
(0.4075)
Sum of squared residuals 743.77 1431 743.63
Sum of squared residuals for the last step 54.44 306.4 54.44
Table 9: Results based on simultaneous estimation of the three seperate equations
6.3 Estimation excluding the variable land-lease contracts
One potential concern is that individuals who buy houses with variable land-lease
contracts are very different from the other buyers. To see whether those contracts
are very different from the others we also estimate our model without those
contracts, see Table 10 for the estimation results. Again, this does not change
any of our conclusions. The general hyperbolic converges to the exponential
discount function and the estimated discount rate is now 7.8 rather than 8.0%.
6.4 Estimation with different calibrated parameters
Table 11 lists the results when we change the calibrated model parameters, φ
(inflation minus one) and the growth rate of house prices that we estimated from
the real GDP trend of the past 25 years but that could also be estimated from
the past 50 years (which gives a lower rate, 1.7 instead of 2.3 %). As a lower
bound we consider a growth rate of 0 %. Finally, we varied the expected market
interest rate. In all cases, our estimated discount rate remains in a reasonable
range, between 6 and 10 %.
7 Final remarks
When agents have present bias, they discount more between now and the next
period than between period t (> 1) and t+1. How fast the future’s discount rate
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Exponential Standard General
hyperbolic hyperbolic
Basic model parameters
ρ 0.0780 ∞ 0.0780
(0.0049) (·) (0.0049)
θ 1.000 2.000 1.000
(0.4075)
Sum of squared residuals 83.35 36342 83.35
Table 10: Results excluding observations of variable land rent.
Growth rate
0 0.0172 0.023
Interest rate = 0.0569
φ = 0 0.0569 0.0608 0.0668
φ = 0.0093 0.0578 0.0743 0.0799
φ = 0.0254 0.0807 0.0961 0.1014
Interest rate = 0.0684
φ = 0 0.0684 0.0684 0.0684
φ = 0.0093 0.0684 0.0693 0.0750
φ = 0.0254 0.0759 0.0911 0.0964
Table 11: Results of the estimated discount rate when we change the calibrated
model parameters
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evaluated today decays is an empirical question. In this paper, we showed that
the discount function can be non-parametrically identified using contracts that
specify payments that take place at various points in time in the future and which
are traded and priced in a market. We then use land lease data from Amsterdam
which have this characteristic to test for present bias in a flexible way. We find no
evidence for present bias in this market. With the data we have, we can however
not rule out that agents discount a lot between today and a week or a month from
now and from then onwards, have a constant discount rate. We can show that
particular functional forms that have been proposed, like the hyperbolic, give a
bad fit. The general hyperbolic specification that has the exponential discount
function as a special case, converges to the exponential. The estimated discount
rate falls in the range between 6 and 10 %. Compared to many of the previous
studies (that find values ranging from negative to plus infinity), those values are
in the reasonable range.
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Appendix
A Deriving the relation between house prices,
land lease payments and the discount rate
Similarly to equation (15), we substitute (11) and (12) into (7) and replace p̂i,τ by its
estimate and use again the approximation log(1 − x) ≈ −x, we obtain an expression
for the fixed land rent
log pi = E log p̂i−γ
r
∑t
s=1 exp
(
−∑t−1t′=τ ψt′)D(s) + exp (∑t0s′=0 ψs′)∑∞s=t0 D(s) exp (∑ss′=t0 ϕs′)∑
∞
s=1D(s)
+υi.
(16)
For the variable land-rent case we can use equation (13) instead of equation (12) to
substitute into equation (7) and use the same steps as above to obtain:
log pi = E log p̂i−γ
r
∑t
s=1 exp
(∑t−1
t′=τ (φt′ − ψt′)
)
D(s) + exp
(∑t0
s′=0 ψs′
)∑
∞
s=t0
D(s) exp
(∑s
s′=t0
ϕs′
)∑
∞
s=1D(s)
+υi
(17)
B Derivation of the asymptotic standard errors
We use the following notation for equation (10),
log p̂i = xiβ + ηJ(i) + νi = yiB + νi, i = 1, . . . n1,
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and for equation (14) we use
logCi = xiβ +
t−1∑
t′=τ
ψt′di + log γJ(i) + νi = ziδ + νi, i = n2, . . . , n3.
As in the paper, we estimate first B with OLS and then substitute this into the second-
stage regression to estimate δ. It implies that yT (log p̂− yB̂)
zT
(
logC − yB̂ − zδ
)  = ( 0
0
)
,
where y and z (log p̂ and logC) without a subscript for the observation implies that
these are matrices (vectors) of all the observations. Then using a Taylor series expansion
for B̂ and δ̂ around the true values and using the central limit theorem we can prove
that, ( √
n1(B̂ −B)√
n3(δ̂ − δ)
)
 N(0,Ω),
where,
Ω =
(
n1Σ1 −n1Σ1zT y(zT z)−1
−n1(zT z)−1(yT y)Σ1 n
2
3
n1
(
zT z
)
−1
yT zΣ1z
T y
(
zT z
)
−1
+ n3Σ2
)
,
and
Σ1 =
(
yT y
)−1
σ2ν Σ2 =
(
ZTZ
)−1
σ2ν .
Substitution of B̂ and δ̂ results in the third-stage regression,
log pi = yiB̂ + gi(ρ, B̂, δ̂) + νi,
for i = n1 + 1, . . . n1 + n2 + n3 and where the coefficient of interest is ρ. The function
gi directly follows from (15) and the two equations from Appendix A. Then,
1√
n2 + n3
n2+n3∑
k=1
νi
∂g(ρ̂, B̂, δ̂)
∂ρ
= 0.
Taking a Taylor-series expansion of ρ̂ around ρ and then taking a Taylor-series expan-
sion of B̂ and δ̂ around B and δ, we obtain
0 =
1√
n2 + n3
n2+n3∑
k=1
νi
∂g(ρ,B, δ)
∂ρ
+
1
n2 + n3
∂
∂ρ
n2+n3∑
k=1
νi
∂g(ρ,B, δ)
∂ρ
√
n2 + n3 (ρ̂− ρ)
+M1 ×
 √n1 (B̂T −B)√
n3
(
δ̂ − δ
) + op(1),
(18)
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where
M̂1 =
(
1
n2+n3
√
n2+n3
n3
∂
∂B
∑n2+n3
k=1 νi
∂g(ρ,B,δ)
∂ρ
1
n2+n3
√
n2+n3
n1
∂
∂δT
∑n2+n3
k=1 νi
∂g(ρ,B,δ)
∂ρ
)
.
Based on the results above, the final part converges to a normal distribution with mean
zero and covariance matrix M1ΩM1, where M1 equals M̂1 but with mean signs instead
of the summation over the observations. Using the central limit theorem, the first part
also converges to a normal distribution with mean zero and the covariance matrix is
the score matrix.
H0 = E
(
∂g(ρ,B, δ)
∂ρ
∂g(ρ, β, δ)
∂ρT
ν2
)
.
Define,
M0 = E
(
∂2g(ρ,B, δ)
∂ρ∂ρT
νi
)
.
By the law of large numbers the matrix in front of the second term of equation (18)
converges to this matrix M0. Then substitution of all these results into equation (18)
and rewriting terms results in,
√
N (ρ̂− ρ) N(0,M−10 (H0 +M1ΩM1)M−10 ).
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